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The agents’ preferences and the topology of networks
Daniel O. Cajueiro
Department of Economics, Catholic University of Brasilia, 70790-160, Brasilia, DF, Brazil.
In this paper, a new framework to study weighed networks is introduced. The idea behind this
methodology is to consider that each node of the network is an agent that desires to satisfy his/her
preferences in an economic sense. Moreover, the formation of a link between two agents depends
on the benefits and costs associated to this link. Therefore, an edge between two given nodes will
only arise if the tradeoff between satisfaction and cost for building it is jointly positive. Using a
computational framework, I intend to show that depending on the agents combination of benefits
and costs, some very well known networks can naturally arise.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.-Fb, 89.75.-Hc 89.75.-k.
During recent years, one of the main issues of the sta-
tistical physics literature has been the study of dynamic
systems such as airports, wireless links, financial insti-
tutions, web pages and other communication networks
and social networks that may be described by complex
weblike structures [24].
On one hand, several models such as small world net-
works [1, 2] and free scale networks [3] have been in-
troduced to specially accommodate the particularities of
these structures that could not be modeled by the seminal
well known random graphs [4]. One should notice that
although most attempts have been devoted to the study
of unweighed undirected networks as the ones presented
in [1, 3], recently some researchers have also introduced
models to deal with undirected weighted networks [5] and
also directed digraphs [6].
On the other hand, several measures have been pre-
sented aiming at characterizing the properties of these
networked systems, for instance, characteristic path
length [7], clustering coefficient [1], efficiency [8, 9],
cost [9], node degree [3], degree correlation [10], weighted
connectivity strength [5] and disparity [11]. The main
advantage of using these measures to analyze these com-
plex structures is the ability to compare different systems
with each other and also to develop a unified theory to
approach these systems.
This paper focuses particularly on undirected weighted
graphs. It proposes another way based on economic and
decision theory to cope with these systems. I suppose
that each node of the network is an agent [25] that has
his/her own preferences and is “starving” to maximize
them. Since all agents in the network will interact in or-
der to maximize their preferences, an edge between two
given nodes will only arise if the tradeoff between satis-
faction and cost for building it is jointly positive. It is
assumed that this happens when the benefit brought to
an agent is greater than his own cost and the cost left by
the other agent (that sometimes is zero). Therefore, if
the benefits brought to the agents by the edge are posi-
tive enough to compensate the cost of construction, then
the edge will exist. This makes sense if one considers that
a connection between agents always brings some kind of
benefits, but the connection sometimes does not exist in
a given network because of the high costs involved.
This tradeoff just presented above is very related to the
formalism developed by [8, 9] since the authors also seek a
tradeoff between satisfaction (measured in a very specific
way as efficiency of communication between the nodes)
and cost (also measured in a very specific way) [26].
Preferences here are modelled as in the economic or de-
cision theory as utility functions. Specifically, I considere
that each agent has an utility function given by
ui(G) =
∑
∀j∈N (G)\i
aij(wij − cij) ∀i ∈ G (1)
where N (G) is the set of nodes in a graph (network)
G, A = [aij ] is the adjacency matrix, W = [wij ] is the
matrix of weights and C = [cij ] is the matrix of costs.
In this context, I am particularly interested in the net-
works that are the solution to the problem
max
A
∑
i∈N (G)
ui(G) (2)
Therefore, this paper does not approach the mecha-
nisms of networks formation but it seeks the best topol-
ogy for a given set of parameters.
The concept of “efficiency” provided by equation (2),
which focuses on the total “productivity” of the net-
work and how this allocation is made among individ-
ual agents [27], is the same one used in [12, 13, 14, 15]
to approach– in a game theoretical framework– the dy-
namics of network formation and the relation between
the concepts of efficiency (introduced above) and stabil-
ity [28].
The focus of this paper, differently from [12, 13, 14,
15], is to provide a computational framework to relate
agent preferences to network topologies. Thus, one has
to maximize equation (2) to reach the desired solution
[29]. One should notice that since equation (2) has been
specified as a linear function, this can be solved as a linear
binary programming problem.
Binary linear programming Binary linear program-
ming is a problem very well studied in the field of op-
erations research and there are several methods to solve
2FIG. 1: A typical regular lattice that arises with n = 20 and
K = 8.
it. Unfortunately, however, due to its combinatorial na-
ture, this problem is not trivially solved. Sometimes due
to its computational cost, the size of the problem is con-
strained or an heuristic method that can provide only a
sub-optimal solution instead of an optimal one is used.
In this paper, since there are no constraints and, in
equation (1), the choice of edges are independent of each
other, the solution of (2) is trivial [30].
Lattices with K neighbors. The arising of a regular
network where each node has K neighbors as a solu-
tion of problem (2) is in general only possible if all the
agents have homogeneous preferences with constant ben-
efits over all agents and a cost that depends only on some
measure of the distance between them (not necessarily
physical distance). In spite of the latter hypothesis being
reasonable in the real world, the former is very hard, since
agents in general have different interests. If the agents
are labelled with ordinal indices from 1 to n, where n is
the number of nodes, without loss of generality, one may
suppose in this case that
wij =
K
2 floor(n/2)
(3)
and
cij =
min (|i − j|, n− |i− j|)
floor(n/2)
(4)
where floor(x) is a function that evaluates the biggest
integer less than x and |x| is the absolute value of x. A
typical lattice that arises in this case when n = 20 and
K = 8 is shown in figure 1.
Random Graphs. Random graphs are the opposite of
regular lattices with k neighbors. The agents take ran-
dom preferences into account. This specially works if the
benefits brought by the connections between two nodes
FIG. 2: A typical random graph that arises with n = 20 and
p = 0.2.
are random with magnitude given by a variable p and
the cost of building this connection is constant as, for
instance,
wij = p+ ǫ (5)
and
cij = 1 (6)
where p is the probability of an edge connecting nodes
i, j ∈ N (g) and ǫ is random variable with uniform distri-
bution in the set [0, 1]. A typical network that arises in
this case when one solves (2) with n = 20 and p = 0.2 is
shown in figure 2.
Again, as in the case of the regular lattices, this kind
of network is not likely to arise in real life due to the
constante cost.
Small Worlds. If one leaves the two extremes presented
above, as in [1, 2], one may arrive at small world net-
works. Therefore, one should now consider a set of agents
that with probability p the connection with another agent
in the network brings a benefit modelled by a random
variable ǫ with uniform distribution in the set [0, 1] and
that with probability (1-p) the benefit is given by a con-
stant. The first mechanism described above models the
unusual phenomenon of receiving a large benefit from
a distant agent or not receiving a good benefit from a
close agent. The latter mechanism models the usual phe-
nomenon of receiving a good mechanism from a close
agent. Additionally, as in real life the cost of establish-
ing a connection depends on some measure of distance.
Mathematically, with probability p
wij = ǫ (7)
3FIG. 3: A typical small world that arises with n = 20, K = 8
and p = 0.2.
where ǫ is a random variable with uniform distribution
in the set [0, 1] and with probability (1 − p)
wij =
K
2 floor(n/2)
(8)
On the other hand,
cij =
min (|i − j|, n− |i− j|)
floor(n/2)
(9)
Therefore, the solution of equation (2) provides a network
with small world behavior.
As we know, several examples of real networks follow
this kind of behavior. If one analyzes the preferences
of the agents, it makes sense. An agent, for example,
receives constant benefits (in average) from being con-
nected to other agents, but there are some agents who
receive lower or bigger benefits than the average. In fig-
ure 3, a typical small world that arises in this case when
one solves (2) with n = 20, K = 8 and p = 0.2 is shown.
Free Scale Networks. Differently from the other sit-
uations considered in this paper, the phenomenon be-
hind the generation of free scale networks seems to be a
kind of cost hierarchy between the nodes, i.e, there are
some nodes that are less costly than the others. There-
fore, some agents will preferentially attach to these nodes.
More specifically, without loss of generality, let wij and
cij be defined as
wij = ǫ (10)
ǫ is a random variable with uniform distribution in the
set [0, 1] and
cij =
i
n
(11)
FIG. 4: A typical free scale network that arises when n = 20.
In equation (11) it was supposed that the nodes with mi-
nor indices are less costly than the others. Hence, these
nodes will likely present the highest degrees in this case.
These networks, like the small worlds networks, are very
likely to be found in real life. One should think for in-
stance of a network of airports. There are some airports
that due to their geographic locations are less costly than
the others. In figure 4, there is a typical free-scale net-
work that arises when one solves (2) with n = 20. In
fact, one may clearly notice the preferencial attachment
presented in the network of this figure.
Moreover, simulations with bigger sets like n = 1000
yielded networks with γ = 2.4 ± 0.2 where γ is the ex-
ponent of equation P (k) ∼ k−γ and k is the degree of a
node in the network.
Final Remarks. In this note, I have presented a new
computational framework to characterize complex net-
works, i.e., one that may characterize the networks by the
preferences of their agents (nodes). Actually, although
only the four most common classes of networks have been
considered, this framework can be used for many classes.
In particular, by mixing the preferences of the agents
presented in equations (8), (9) (10) and (11), one may
find networks with small world behavior and also attach
preferences. Moreover, this methodology also works for
weighted digraphs.
On one hand, linear utility functions, which means that
the agents are indifferent to the risk, were the only class of
utility functions considered here. A question that arises
is: What effect is expected in the topology of the net-
works if the agents are, for instance, averse to the risk
with concave utility functions [31]. Furthermore, no con-
straint has been considered in the optimization problem
provided by (2). What kind of constraints are the agents
in the real world subjected to and what kind of effect will
these constraints cause in the topology of networks?
On the other hand, the matrices W and C here were
4considered exogenous, i.e., they were formed prior to the
solution of the problem. It is also possible to suppose that
these matrices have elements that depend on the param-
eters of a given iteration of the problem. For instance,
the benefit brought by node i to node j could depend on
the number of nodes that i actually possesses [32]. This
could be the root for the study of network formation us-
ing this kind of framework.
In summary, this proposed framework may be used
to improve the understanding of these complex networks
that are present everywhere.
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